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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, plea bargaining has spread beyond the countries
where it originated—the United States and other common law jurisdictions—and
has become a global phenomenon.1 Plea bargaining is spreading rapidly to civil
law countries that previously viewed the practice with skepticism. And it has
now arrived at international criminal courts.2
While domestic plea bargaining is often limited to non-violent crimes,3 the
international courts allow sentence negotiations for even the most heinous
offenses, including genocide and crimes against humanity.4 Its use remains
highly controversial, and debates about plea bargaining in international courts
continue in court opinions and academic commentary: is it appropriate to offer
* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. This article is an adapted version of Plea Bargaining,
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Fausto Pocar & Linda Carter eds., 2013). The chapter and article
also draw on my previous work in JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS (2009)
and my collaboration with Thomas Weigend on Negotiated Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES AND RULES (Göran Sluiter et al. eds., 2013). I thank Linda Carter for inviting me to take part in the
Symposium and for her helpful edits on the earlier version of this piece.
1. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Plea Bargaining, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 35 (Fausto Pocar
& Linda Carter eds., 2013).
2. Id.
3. JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 28 (2009) (Civil law countries are
more likely to limit plea bargaining to non-violent crimes, although a few states in the United States have also
imposed such restrictions).
4. Turner, supra note 1, at 35.
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sentencing concessions to a defendant who pleads guilty to a heinous crime
involving thousands of victims? How can the avoidance of a public trial be
reconciled with some of the professed goals of international criminal law,
including the goal of creating a more accurate historical record of the atrocities
and that of providing victims with a voice in the process? Conversely, given the
very limited resources and enforcement powers of international criminal courts,
could these courts achieve any of their goals effectively without the use of plea
bargaining?5
The guilty plea of Biljana Plavšić at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) illustrates some of the potential pitfalls of plea
bargaining in international crimes cases.6 As co-president of the Serbian Republic
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Plavšić assisted in the campaign of ethnic cleansing
against Bosnian Muslims and Croats, which resulted in the killing of more than
50,000 non-Serbs and the expulsion of many more.7 She was indicted on two
counts of genocide and six counts of crimes against humanity.8 In return for her
guilty plea to persecution as a crime against humanity, prosecutors dropped both
genocide counts and five of the lesser crimes against humanity counts and
recommended a sentence of 15 to 25 years of imprisonment.9 Yet the Trial
Chamber sentenced Plavšić to 11 years, noting that her guilty plea made a
significant contribution to uncovering the truth about the crimes and promoting
reconciliation in the region.10 The court’s leniency enraged Bosnian Muslims,11
and their outrage was reignited when, just before her early release for “good
behavior,” Plavšić publicly renounced her admission of guilt and stated that she
had pleaded guilty simply to get a break in her sentence.12
Plavšić’s case was by no means the only one in which international
prosecutors offered to drop serious charges and recommend a more lenient
sentence to obtain a defendant’s guilty plea.13 Nor was it the only one in which
defendants offered statements of remorse and the court rewarded them with
leniency, but their sincerity and effect on reconciliation remained in question.14
Plavšić’s case was also one of several in which the defendant received significant

5. Id. at 214.
6. Turner, supra note 1, at 35–36.
7. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 41 (ICTY Feb. 27, 2003)
[hereinafter Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement].
8. Turner, supra note 1, at 35–36.
9. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 7, at ¶5.
10. Id. at ¶ 73.
11. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CONSTRUCTING A
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 74 (2007).
12. Olivera Simic, Bringing “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War Criminals, and the Interaction Between the
Cosmopolitan and the Local, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1388, 1400 (2011).
13. COMBS, supra note 11, at 74–76.
14. Id. at 78, 84–85.
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sentencing or charging reductions even though he or she did not cooperate with
the prosecution in other cases.15
Plavšić’s guilty plea—and others like it—may help explain why international
criminal courts have not fully embraced plea bargaining. Indeed, ICTY judges
have on several occasions refused to follow the parties’ sentence agreements and
in some cases have attempted to place limits on charge bargaining.16 While
judges have recognized the potential of plea bargaining to contribute to truthseeking and reconciliation (particularly when the defendant cooperates with the
prosecution in other cases), they have also remained skeptical of guilty pleas that
are rewarded for nothing more than their efficiency.17
This skepticism is based in part on the unique features of international
criminal justice, especially the horrific nature of the crimes prosecuted and the
emphasis on uncovering the truth about these crimes.18 But the resistance to plea
bargaining also relates to the blending of inquisitorial and adversarial approaches
at the international courts.19 The inquisitorial tradition of full and independent
judicial inquiry into the facts of the case, which has influenced the procedures of
international courts, helps explain why plea bargaining continues to remain
controversial in that setting.20
This article highlights the different approaches to plea bargaining in civil
law/inquisitorial and common law/adversarial systems and how the blending of
these traditions has influenced plea bargaining at the international criminal
courts. It ends with an overview of the debates concerning plea bargaining in
international criminal procedure and some recommendations for making the
practice more consistent with the goals of international criminal justice.
II. PLEA BARGAINING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
A. Common Law Systems
Plea bargaining has long been a staple of common law criminal justice
systems.21 In the United States, plea bargaining was practiced as early as the mid19th century, and today more than 90% of convictions at the state and federal
level result from guilty pleas.22 Australia, Canada, Nigeria, New Zealand, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom also use plea bargaining regularly.23 In the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 74–76, 99, 103–06.
Id. at 76–77, 81–83; TURNER, supra note 3, at 246.
COMBS, supra note 11, at 77.
TURNER, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Turner, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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typical common law plea bargain, the defendant agrees to plead guilty and
perhaps cooperate with the prosecution in other cases in return for reduced
charges or the prosecutor’s agreement to seek a lower sentence.24
Plea bargaining holds two important advantages that help explain its
dominance in common law systems and its recent spread to new jurisdictions.25
First, it conserves resources by allowing the parties to negotiate the outcome of a
criminal case and eliminating the need for a full trial.26 Second, in complex,
multi-defendant cases, it helps prosecutors obtain critical insider information
about criminal networks.27 As crime becomes more sophisticated and
transnational, and as it taxes more of the criminal justice system’s resources, plea
bargaining is increasingly seen as a tool for efficient and successful
prosecutions.28
Despite its rising popularity, plea bargaining remains controversial in the
countries where it originated, and commentators continue to call for reform or
outright abolition of the practice.29 Some are concerned that the plea discounts
offered as part of bargaining are often so large that they could effectively coerce
innocent defendants into pleading guilty.30 Others argue that the unduly generous
concessions of plea bargaining are unfair to victims and undercut the deterrent
effect of sanctions.31 Finally, plea bargains are criticized for interfering with the
court’s ability to uncover the truth.32
To reduce the dangers that a plea bargain may be unfair or factually
inaccurate, common law jurisdictions introduced certain procedural safeguards.33
For instance, in the United States, at the hearing where the defendant tenders a
guilty plea, the court conducts an inquiry to ensure that the plea is voluntary,
informed, and factually based.34 If the parties agreed that the prosecutor will
merely recommend a sentence, then the court may accept or reject that
recommendation.35 Even when the parties agree on a specific sentence, the court

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as a Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Albert W.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983).
31. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981) (currently
known as CALIF. L. REV.); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301
(1987).
32. E.g., Alschuler, supra note 31; Schulhofer, supra note 30.
33. Turner, supra note 1.
34. Id.
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B), (c)(3)(B) (The court must, however, advise the defendant that he would
not be able to withdraw his guilty plea if the court rejects the recommendation).
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may reject the agreement if it is inconsistent with the interests of justice.36 In
some common law jurisdictions, internal regulations also require prosecutors to
consult with victims before entering into plea negotiations.37
But these safeguards do not go far enough in addressing the various concerns
about plea bargaining.38 Judges only become involved in the plea bargaining
process after the negotiations have ended, by which time the parties have reached
an agreement that they are unlikely to want to upset.39 They may conceal
inconvenient details about the nature of the plea negotiations or even present
facts about the case that are inaccurate.40 The court is unlikely to uncover these
gaps and inaccuracies because it is almost entirely dependent on the parties for
evidence in the case.41 It is also unlikely to spot inadequate representation
because of the limited exposure to defense counsel when the case ends in a guilty
plea.42 And since informed advice by counsel is critical to the defendant’s ability
to tender a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the lack of oversight undermines
the court’s ability to ensure that a guilty plea is genuine and factually justified.43
Further, judges themselves are usually interested in expediting cases and often
hold perfunctory hearings that fail to probe meaningfully into the facts of the
case or the voluntariness of the guilty plea.44
In the end, a strong case can be made that the procedural safeguards present
in common law systems inadequately protect the fairness and accuracy of plea
bargains.45 This helps explain why plea bargaining, despite its prevalence in
common law systems, remains deeply controversial.46

36. See, e.g., id. at 11(c)(3)(C); see also In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 711–12 (9th Cir. 2007); Virgin
Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 375 (3rd Cir. 2001).
37. Code for Crown Prosecutors—Draft for Public Consultation § 10.2 (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/Code_for_Crown_Prosecutors_%20draft_%20for_public_consultation.pdf
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL § 9-16.030 (citing Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, P.L. 97-291, § 6, 96 Stat. 1256)
(stating that United States Attorneys should make reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider
victims’ views about, any proposed or contemplated plea negotiations).
38. Turner, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1611 (2005); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea
Negotiation: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212–23 (2006).
45. Turner, supra note 1.
46. Id.
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B. Civil Law Systems
Until the 1980s, civil law jurisdictions generally regarded plea bargaining as
inimical to their traditions of criminal procedure. Plea bargaining was seen as
inconsistent with the principle of mandatory prosecution and with the duty of the
court to investigate the facts of the case independently.47 The idea that the parties
could resolve the case in an informal and consensual fashion starkly conflicted
with the inquisitorial model of detailed judicial inquiry into the substantive
truth.48 From a practical standpoint, the lack of juries and more limited defense
rights also made plea bargaining less necessary.49
Nonetheless, as civil law countries faced an increasing number of complex
criminal cases and expanded defense rights, they also sought ways to conserve
resources.50 Modified forms of plea bargaining have gradually come to be
accepted.51 In Germany, practitioners and judges began informally negotiating
cases in the 1980s, and the practice grew for several decades before it was
formally authorized by legislation.52 In other countries, such as Italy, France,
Russia, and Spain, the legislature took the initiative and introduced limited forms
of plea bargaining as part of broader criminal procedure reforms.53
Because of the tension between plea bargaining and the inquisitorial
tradition, the type of bargaining introduced in civil law countries has been more
restrained.54 The civil law variant of plea bargaining usually applies only to
relatively minor, nonviolent crimes.55 Sentence reductions as part of a plea
bargain are often capped, and concessions other than sentencing reductions, such
as charge reductions or detention conditions, are typically prohibited.56 Like their
common law counterparts, civil law systems require that an admission of guilt be
voluntary, informed, and factually based.57 But civil law judges typically have
better tools to ensure that this is the case.58 They are often involved in the
negotiations between the parties and can examine the terms of the bargain before
47. Id.
48. See TURNER, supra note 3, at 75–76.
49. Turner, supra note 1.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. E.g., id. at 73, 142 (discussing Germany and Russia); Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the
Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 116 (Eric Luna & Marianne Wade eds., forthcoming 2012); Luca Marafioti, Italian Criminal
Procedure: A System Caught Between Two Traditions, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 81 (Maximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008).
54. Turner, supra note 1.
55. Id.
56. Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Thomas Weigend, Negotiated Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 1401 (G⎯ran Slutter et al. eds, 2013).
57. Turner, supra note 1, at 39.
58. Id.
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they are final.59 They have access to the entire investigative file in the case and
can independently gather additional evidence if they have doubts about the facts
underlying a plea agreement.60 More generally, they have greater authority to
oversee plea agreements, including agreements about the charges.61
Civil law systems also continue to favor confessions over guilty pleas.62 In
contrast to guilty pleas, confessions are typically more detailed and do not
eliminate the trial process entirely.63 Instead, courts receiving a confession are
expected to continue the proceedings and review the evidence supporting the
credibility of the confession.64 This is consistent with the traditional commitment
of continental systems to uncovering the precise truth of the case.65 For the same
reason, continental systems place a greater emphasis on ensuring that admissions
of guilt rest on a solid factual basis.66 Some countries even expressly prohibit in
their constitutions a conviction based solely on the suspect’s confession.67 In
addition, civil law countries provide for broader disclosure of evidence to the
defendant before plea negotiations begin, and many require that a defendant
consult with counsel before pleading guilty.68
In some civil law countries, victims’ rights are also considered in the plea
bargaining scheme.69 Victims often take part in plea hearings, may be consulted
before a court approves a plea agreement, and in some cases can veto a plea
agreement.70
Although plea bargaining is being increasingly adopted by civil law
jurisdictions, the practice is not yet universal.71 A number of jurisdictions have
opted for simplified trial procedures as an alternative or complement to plea
bargaining.72 Others, such as Japan, encourage confessions tacitly, by regularly
rewarding such conduct with more lenient treatment.73 In short, civil law

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1404; Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French
Criminal Justice, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 116, 128 (Erik Luna & Marianne L.
Wade eds., 2012); Gwladys Gilliéron, The Risks of Summary Proceedings, Plea Bargains, and Penal Orders in
Producing Wrongful Convictions in the U.S. and Europe, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE 237, 250 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2013).
62. Turner, supra note 2, at 39.
63. Id.
64. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1402.
65. Id.
66. Turner, supra note 1, at 39.
67. TURNER, supra note 3, at 273.
68. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1402; TURNER, supra note 3, at 272.
69. Turner, supra note 1, at 39.
70. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1404 n. 191.
71. Turner, supra note 1, at 40.
72. TURNER, supra note 3, at Ch. 4 (discussing abbreviated procedures in China and Japan).
73. TURNER, supra note 3, at 171–98; David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in THE JAPANESE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 140 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). Critics Hit
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countries continue to regard plea bargaining with greater skepticism than their
common law counterparts.74 This helps explain the somewhat more restrained
form of plea bargaining adopted by international criminal courts, which combine
features of both the civil law and common law models.75
III. PLEA BARGAINING AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
A. The Introduction of Plea Bargaining
As plea bargaining began spreading to an increasing number of domestic
jurisdictions in the 1990s, it was perhaps not surprising that it ultimately made its
way to international criminal courts.76 All such courts, with the exception of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, provide for the possibility of
plea bargaining.77 But the introduction of plea bargaining was far from
predetermined and remains controversial.78 In fact, three of the courts that allow
plea bargaining in their statutes—the International Criminal Court (ICC), the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon—have yet
to resolve a case through plea bargaining.79 And the two major international
tribunals to use plea bargaining extensively—ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—have not accepted a negotiated guilty
plea since 2007.80

Japan’s New Plea Bargaining System, Say It Opens Door to False Testimony, JAPAN TIMES (May 29, 2016),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/29/national/crime-legal/critics-hit-japans-new-plea-bargainingsystem-say-opens-door-false-testimony/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (Just this year,
Japan adopted a limited version of plea bargaining, which allows prosecutors to reward defendants who provide
information against other suspects).
74. Turner, supra note 1, at 40.
75. Id.
76. Turner, supra note 1, at 41.
77. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1395.
78. Turner, supra note 1, at 41.
79. Id.
80. ICTY Annual Report 2007, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and
%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2007_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2008, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20
Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2008_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2009, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20
Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2009_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2010, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and
%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2010_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); ICTY Annual Report 2011, available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20
and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2011_en.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (Although the ICTY and ICTR are in the process of completing their cases, this does not fully explain
the lack of guilty pleas in the last five years. Since 2007, the ICTY has had 13 defendants who have moved into
the pretrial stage and 20 more who were at different trial stages, but none of these defendants has pleaded
guilty).
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When the ICTY and ICTR were established in the early 1990s, neither their
statutes nor their rules mentioned plea bargaining.81 The drafters of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure expressly rejected a proposal to allow offers of immunity to
suspects who provide substantial cooperation to the prosecution.82 Both
testimonial immunity and plea bargaining were seen as inappropriate in the
context of international criminal prosecution.83
Yet, the Statutes and Rules of the ICTY and ICTR did provide for guilty
pleas, which was a stepping-stone to the introduction of plea bargaining.84 The
ICTY received its first guilty plea in May 1996, when Dražen Erdemović pled
guilty to crimes against humanity for participating in the killing of hundreds of
Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.85 His initial guilty plea was apparently not
induced by prosecutorial promises of lenient treatment.86 But because he did not
fully comprehend the consequences of his guilty plea, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber concluded that the plea was uninformed and therefore invalid.87 At the
same time, in commenting on guilty pleas more broadly, the Appeals Chamber
lauded the merits of plea bargaining and concluded that the practice could make a
valuable contribution to international criminal justice.88 Reassured of the
acceptability of plea bargaining at the ICTY, Erdemović and the prosecution
reached a plea agreement under which Erdemović would plead guilty to the
lesser offense of war crimes and the prosecution would recommend a lower
sentence to the court.89 The ICTY found that Erdemović’s second guilty plea was
sufficiently informed.90
Once the ICTY Appeals Chamber displayed its approval of plea bargaining,
the practice quickly gained a foothold.91 In 2000, Stevan Todorović entered a
guilty plea that was the product of a negotiated plea agreement.92 Between 2001

81. Turner, supra note 1, at 41.
82. Judge Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY, Statement Made at a Briefing to Members of
Diplomatic Missions, U.N. Doc. IT/29 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE ICTY 649,
652 (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995).
83. Turner, supra note 1, at 41.
84. ICTY R. P. & EVID., 19, 20, IT/32/REV. 49 (22 May 2013) (stating that “the Trial Chamber shall read
the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands
the indictment, and instruct the accused to enter a plea. . . . “ The original Rule 62, common to the ICTY and
ICTR Rules of Procedure, also provided that defendants enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at their initial
appearance).
85. Turner, supra note 1, at 41–42.
86. COMBS, supra note 11, at 60.
87. Turner, supra note 1, at 42.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgement (ICTY Mar. 5, 1998)
[hereinafter Erdemović, Sentencing Judgement].
91. Turner, supra note 1, at 42.
92. Id.
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and 2003, thirteen more defendants did the same.93 As of August 15, 2011, the
ICTY convicted sixty-four defendants, twenty of whom pled guilty.94 The ICTR
accepted its first guilty plea from Jean Kambanda in 1998.95 Between 1998 and
August 2011, the tribunal convicted thirty-seven more defendants of international
crimes, seven of whom pleaded guilty.96
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was signed in 1998,
just about the same time that the international criminal tribunals began accepting
their first guilty pleas.97 It provided for “proceedings on admission of guilt,” a
term chosen over “guilty pleas” as a compromise between the civil law and
common law traditions.98 Despite the different phrasing, the statute still allows
negotiations between the defendant and the prosecution about the disposition of
the case.99 Article 65(5) of the ICC Statute implicitly acknowledges the
possibility of such negotiations by noting that “discussions” between the parties
about the charges, the admission of guilt, or the sentence will not be binding on
the court.100
Although the ICC has yet to accept an admission of guilt, it is expecting to
receive one in August, when Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi has said he would formally
plead guilty to the war crime of “attacking buildings dedicated to religion and
historic monuments.”101 Whether this guilty plea will remain an aberration or
prompt a thriving practice of plea bargaining remains to be seen. Some authors
have expressed skepticism that bargaining would take hold at the ICC, given the
broad authority of the court to reject agreements between the parties.102 But

93. Id.
94. ICTY, KEY FIGURES OF ICTY CASES (May 20, 2012), available at http://www.icty.org/sections/
TheCases/KeyFigures (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (The number of convicted
defendants does not include those whose cases are being appealed).
95. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 3 (Sept. 4, 1998)
[hereinafter Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence].
96. See Status of Cases, ICTR, http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 15,
2011) (This number does not include a guilty plea by a former ICTR witness for giving false testimony to the
Tribunal. Also, the number of convictions does not include seven convictions that are currently on appeal).
97. Turner, supra note 1, at 42.
98. Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8 CHI.-KENT J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (2008).
99. Turner, supra note 1, at 42–43.
100. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(5), 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9.
101. Malian Jihadi To Plead Guilty in ICC Cultural Destruction Trial, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2016,
8:15
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/may/24/malian-jihadi-to-plead-guilty-forgiveness-icccultural-destruction-trial.
102. See Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1390–91; Sergey Vasiliev, Ongwen at the ICC and the
Possible ‘Guilty Plea’: A Response to Alex Whiting, POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://postconflictjustice.com/ongwen-at-the-icc-and-the-possible-guilty-plea-a-response-to-alex-whiting
(on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (expressing skepticism that a defendant such as Dominic
Ongwen is likely to plead guilty, as well as broader concerns about the use of plea bargaining at the ICC).
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others have argued that the court is not likely to be effective in accomplishing its
goals unless it begins relying on plea bargains to some degree.103
B. Conditions for Valid Plea Agreements
At all international criminal courts, a plea agreement typically consists of
some variation of the following exchange: the defendant admits guilt and waives
various trial rights in exchange for a reduction of the sentence or the charges.104
The negotiations occur between the parties, typically before trial, and judges are
not involved.105
The most common agreements concern sentencing, but agreements about the
charges have also been reached a number of times at the ICTY and ICTR.106
Charge bargains have been more controversial because of concerns that they may
obscure the true facts of the case and the full extent of the defendant’s
culpability.107 In a dissenting opinion, ICTY Judge Schomburg compared charge
bargains to “de facto granting partial amnesty/impunity by the Prosecutor” and
criticized them as conflicting with the Tribunals’ mission to avoid impunity, to
establish the truth, and to promote peace and reconciliation.108
The Tribunals’ mild skepticism toward charge bargains is consistent with the
civil law approach to this issue.109 Charge bargains are typically disfavored in
civil law systems.110 They are viewed as inconsistent with the rule of mandatory
prosecution that still prevails in many civil law countries, as well as with the
court’s duty to establish to truth of the case.111 Civil law judges usually have the
authority to modify the charges brought by prosecutors, which undermines
prosecutors’ ability to engage in charge bargains.112
Tribunal judges do not have the same power to recharacterize the charges,
but they have ample authority to restrain charge bargains in other ways.113 First,
103. Regina E. Rauxloh, Plea Bargaining—A Necessary Tool for the International Criminal Court
Prosecutor, 94 JUDICATURE 178, 184 (2011); Alex Whiting, Encouraging the Acceptance of Guilty Pleas at the
ICC, POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://postconflictjustice.com/encouraging-theacceptance-of-guilty-pleas-at-the-icc (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of
Amended Plea Agreement Between Momir Nikolic and the Office of the Prosecutor 2 (ICTY May 7, 2003);
Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 7, at ¶ 2.
105. Turner, supra note 1, at 43.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgement, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Schomburg, ¶ 11 (ICTY Mar. 30, 2004); see also id. at ¶¶ 6–7.
109. Turner, supra note 1, at 43–44.
110. Id. at 44.
111. Id.
112. E.g., Turner, supra note 1, at 105–06.
113. Int’l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-BD/01-03-11 Reg. 55 (May 26, 2004)
(At the ICC, under the controversial Regulation 55, judges to have the authority to change “the legal

229

2017 / Plea Bargaining and International Criminal Justice
and most obviously, plea agreements—including agreements concerning the
charges—are not binding on the court.114 Second, after the pretrial chamber or
judge initially confirms the charges, the prosecutor cannot unilaterally withdraw
or alter them without the court’s consent.115 Finally, because judges at the
international criminal courts have broad sentencing discretion, they can thwart a
charge agreement by imposing a sentence that they believe is more
commensurate with the defendant’s blameworthiness.116 For all these reasons,
some have argued that charge bargains at the international criminal tribunals are
not likely to be effective.117
Bargaining at the ICTY and ICTR has also involved concessions other than,
on the one hand, guilty pleas and, on the other, reductions of the sentence or
charges. A common and well-accepted item of exchange is a commitment by the
defendant to cooperate with the prosecution in other proceedings. Such
cooperation is expressly envisioned as a mitigating factor by the ICTY and ICTR
Rules pertaining to sentencing.118 Although the prosecution has great influence in
ensuring that substantial cooperation will be credited by the court, international
courts will assess the value of the cooperation independently and may depart
from the prosecutor’s recommendations on the issue.119 This is consistent with
the civil law influence on the Tribunals and with the greater responsibility and
authority of judges to investigate and determine the facts of the case.120
Other concessions that have been exchanged are not specifically authorized
by the Tribunals’ Statutes or Rules. These include: withdrawal of defense
motions,121 waivers of appeal,122 dropping certain factual allegations,123

characterization of facts to accord with the crimes under articles 6, 7 or 8, or to accord with the form of
participation of the accused under articles 25 or 28, without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in
the charges and any amendments to the charges.” This appears to give ICC judges somewhat greater control
over charge bargains than Tribunal judges had).
114. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 62ter; Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTR
RPE), R. P. & EVID. 62,62bis [hereinafter ICTR].
115. Turner, supra note 1, at 44.
116. Id.
117. Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of
Sentencing Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 79 (2006).
118. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 101(B)(ii); ICTR R. P. & EVID. 101(B)(ii).
119. Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 126 (ICTY July 5, 2001); see also
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 96 (ICTY Mar. 8,
2006) [hereinafter Momir Nikolić, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal].
120. Turner, supra note 1, at 44.
121. E.g., Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 6 (ICTY July 31,
2001) [hereinafter Todorović, Sentencing Judgement].
122. E.g., Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 15 (ICTY Dec. 10,
2003) [hereinafter Obrenović, Sentencing Judgement].
123. E.g., Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 61 (ICTY Dec.
2, 2003) [hereinafter Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement].
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recommendations as to imprisonment location,124 and promises not to refer a case
to national authorities.125 Courts have not always been able to deliver on some of
the prosecutorial promises on that list, which has led to skepticism among
defendants about the usefulness and fairness of plea bargaining.126
Plea agreements at the Tribunals must be in writing and must be disclosed to
the court in a public session. At all three international criminal courts discussed
here, agreements are not binding on the court.127 Instead, the court will review the
agreements, to ensure that they are voluntary128 and fair129 and to verify that they
are consistent with the “interests of justice,” including the interests of victims.130
Placing the ultimate authority to review and approve the agreement with the court
is consistent with both civil and common law approaches to plea bargaining.
To ascertain whether an agreement is consistent with the interests of justice,
international criminal courts may call victims to testify at the plea hearing or at
the sentencing hearing following the guilty plea. The ICTY and ICTR have not
relied on victim testimony when reviewing plea agreements, but the ICC Statute
specifically allows the court to involve victims in the proceedings on admission
of guilt.131
When faced with an agreement that it believes may not be consistent with the
interests of justice, an ICC trial chamber has two options. It may refer the case to
proceed under the ordinary trial procedure.132 Alternatively, if it believes that “a
more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of
justice, in particular the interests of the victims, [it] may: (a) Request the
Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of
witnesses. . . .”133 This “additional evidence” procedure reduces the efficiency of
plea bargaining, but it arguably helps protect the interests of the international
community and of victims in compiling a detailed and accurate record of the

124. Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No. ICTR-00-60, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 187 (ICTY Apr. 13,
2006); Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR-01-77, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 97 (ICTY Feb. 23, 2007)
[hereinafter Nzabirinda, Judgement and Sentence].
125. Nzabirinda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 124, at ¶¶ 42-46; Prosecutor v. Zelenović, Case
No. IT-96-23/2-S, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw the Motion Under Rule 11bis (ICTY May
8, 2007).
126. Nancy Amoury Combs, Obtaining Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: Prosecutorial Difficulties,
in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 58–59 (Eric Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012).
127. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(5), 17 July 198, A/CONF.183/9; ICTY R.
P. & EVID., 62ter; ICTR R. P. & EVID., 62bis.
128. Todorović, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 121, at ¶ 16.
129. Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶ 49.
130. E.g., Obrenović, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 122, at ¶ 19.
131. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(4), 17 July 198, A/CONF.183/9; see also id.
art. 68(3) (“Where the personal interests of victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns
to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a
manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial”).
132. Id. at art. 65(4)(b).
133. Id. at art. 65(4)(a).
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crimes. It also reflects the influence of the civil law approach, which emphasizes
the duty of the court to fully investigate and document the facts of the case.
C. Conditions for Valid Guilty Pleas
In choosing to forego a trial, a defendant waives a number of other important
rights—the right to be presumed innocent until guilt is established beyond a
reasonable doubt, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the
right to compel witnesses to appear on his behalf, and the right to testify or to
remain silent at trial. The decision to waive these rights is a momentous one, and
the court must ensure that it is made freely and knowingly.
At all international criminal courts, therefore, judges must examine the
validity of guilty pleas. At the ICTY and ICTR, a guilty plea must be voluntary,
informed, unequivocal, and based on sufficient factual basis to be accepted.134 At
the ICC, the requirements are generally the same, with several notable exceptions
discussed later in this article. The inquiry into the defendant’s admission of guilt
to ensure that it is informed, voluntary, and factually based is consistent with
both the civil law and common law approaches to this question. It also supports
the Tribunals’ goals to provide fair trials and serve as a criminal procedure model
for national systems.
ICTY and ICTR case law has elaborated on the meaning of some of the
requirements for a valid guilty plea. ICTY and ICTR Rules do not provide a
definition of “voluntariness.”135 But in Prosecutor v. Erdemović, the Appeals
Chamber explained that for a guilty plea to be voluntary, the accused must be
“mentally fit to understand the consequences of pleading guilty” and must not be
“affected by any threats, inducements or promises.”136A defendant is deemed to
be mentally fit and competent to plead guilty when he is able “to participate in
the proceedings (in some cases with assistance) and sufficiently exercise the
identified rights, i.e. to make his or her defence.”137 Being “merely depressed
over being isolated while in detention,” for example, is not sufficient to render a
defendant incompetent to plead guilty.138
In general, the threshold for an involuntary guilty plea cannot be met simply
by pointing to ordinary pressures attendant to the criminal process. For example,
when an ICTY trial chamber suggested to a defendant that it might reject his
134. ICTY R. P. & EVID., 62bis; ICTR R. P. & EVID., 62(B)(iii).
135. Id.
136. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and
Judge Vohrah, ¶ 8 (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Erdemović, Joint Separate Opinion of McDonald and
Vohrah].
137. Prosecutor v. Stanisić, Case No. IT-03-69, Decision on Stanisić Defence’s Motion on the Fitness of
the Accused to Stand Trial with Confidential Annexes, ¶ 9 (ICTY Apr. 27, 2006); see also Erdemović, Joint
Separate Opinion of McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 136, at ¶¶ 10–12.
138. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Judgement, ¶ 62 (Oct. 19, 2000) [hereinafter
Kambanda, Judgement].
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guilty plea to lesser charges because it did not appear to be factually based, this
did not render involuntary his subsequent guilty plea to more serious charges.139
Similarly, a guilty plea was found voluntary even though the defendant was
isolated in detention and consulted only with assigned defense counsel, rather
than a counsel of his choice, before pleading guilty.140 The same ruling held that
when the defendant pled guilty in the hope that he would avoid life
imprisonment, but this was not explicitly stated in the plea agreement, and he
was later sentenced to a life term by the court, the guilty plea was still
voluntary.141 Finally, if a defendant affirms in the plea agreement or at the plea
hearing that he is pleading guilty of his own free will, he will generally have
difficulty later showing that his plea was coerced.142
This raises the question whether international criminal courts will consider a
guilty plea to be involuntary if it is submitted under the threat of a much more
severe sentence upon conviction at trial. In common law systems such as the
United States, such a scenario does not render a guilty plea involuntary.143 Yet in
some civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, threats of a disproportionately
harsher sentence upon conviction at trial would invalidate a subsequent
admission of guilt.144
Although both civil law and common law systems require that guilty pleas be
voluntary, their definitions of voluntariness differ somewhat. Common law
countries tend to treat defendants as autonomous agents who are able to decide
for themselves whether to accept a particular plea bargain, even if the difference
between a guilty plea and a conviction after trial is extraordinary. By contrast,
civil law countries tend to take a more paternalistic approach and limit the types
of bargains that can be offered to defendants. In Italy, France, Russia, and
Germany, for example, plea bargains are limited (as a matter of law or practice)
to relatively minor crimes carrying a lower sentence.145 A number of civil law

139. Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, ¶¶ 8–12 (ICTY July
18, 2005) [hereinafter Babić, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal].
140. Kambanda, Judgement, supra note 139, at ¶¶ 57, 64.
141. Id at ¶ 63.
142. Babić, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 139, at ¶¶ 8–12; Kambanda, Judgement, supra
note 139, at ¶¶ 57, 64.
143. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
144. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] GSSt 1/04, Mar. 3, 2005 (Ger.) (“It is unlawful
to pressure the accused into a confession by threatening him with an inappropriately severe sentence or by
promising him advantages not provided for by the law, to promise the accused a more lenient sentence in
exchange for waiving his right to appeal. . . . “) [hereinafter BGH]; BGH 4 StR 84/04, Urteil v. 16.9.2004 (Ger.)
(reversing judgment and ordering new trial of defendant who was threatened with pretrial detention if he
refused to confess and persisted in filing motions to subpoena witnesses located abroad); BGH StR 411/04,
Beschluss v. 12.1.2005 (Ger.) (holding that a proposed plea discount of about 50%, from a sentence of 6-7 years
to a sentence of 3 years and 6 months, was unlawful, because it was an unwarranted reward for a confession and
might unduly coerce a defendant into confessing); BGH StV 2004, 470 (5 StR 579/03) (Ger.) (holding that a
two-thirds discount, from 6 years to 2 years, is unlawful because it may coerce a defendant to plead guilty).
145. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1401; TURNER, supra note 3, at 75.
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countries also limit the sentencing discount that can be offered to induce
defendants to waive their right to trial.146 So far, the international tribunals appear
to have approached voluntariness along the lines of the common law model, but
it is still possible that future international courts, particularly the ICC, will take
the approach of civil law jurisdictions and view voluntariness as a more
demanding requirement.
One indication that the ICC may take this approach is that it already requires
consultation with defense counsel to ensure that admissions of guilt are
voluntary.147 No such requirement exists at the ICTY and ICTR or in common
law jurisdictions, where defendants can waive their right to counsel before
pleading guilty.148 Instead, the ICC approach is instead consistent with that of
civil law jurisdictions, which limit the ability of defendants to represent
themselves in certain cases where self-representation is unlikely to be in the
defendants’ best interests.149
For the guilty plea to be valid, it must also be informed. The ICTY Appeals
Chamber has explained that this means that “the accused must understand the
nature of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty to
them.”150 The ICC statute uses similar language in describing the requirement.151
As the ICTY has elaborated, the court must ensure that the defendant understands
the key elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty152 and appreciates
the differences between alternative charges.153 In Prosecutor v. Erdemović, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber invalidated a guilty plea to crimes against humanity
because the defendant had not been adequately informed that a crime against

146. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1401.
147. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(1)(b), 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9
(requiring that an admission of guilt be made “voluntarily . . . after sufficient consultation with defence
counsel”).
148. E.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004); R v. Hardy, 79 ALTA. L.R. (2d) 211 (Alta. Q.B., Dec. 14,
1990).
149. Turner & Weigend, supra note 56, at 1402.
150. Erdemović, Joint Separate Opinion of McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 136, at ¶ 8(b). Although
the quote is from a Separate Opinion, at least four judges concurred in this description of the standard for
determining whether a guilty plea is informed. Judge Li disagreed with the conclusion that Erdemović’s guilty
plea was uninformed, but it was not clear whether he disagreed with the legal standard itself. Prosecutor v.
Erdemović, Case. No. IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997).
151. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(1), 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9 (“ . . . the
Trial Chamber shall determine whether: (a) The accused understands the nature and consequences of the
admission of guilt”).
152. Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶ 12. (The trial chamber “may inquire into
the accused’s understanding of the elements of the crime or crimes to which he has pled guilty to ensure that his
understanding of the requirements of the crime reflects his actual conduct and participation as well as his state
of mind or intent when he committed the crime”).
153. Erdemović, Joint Separate Opinion of McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 136, at ¶ 14 (explaining
that defendant must understand “the nature and distinction between the alternative charges and the
consequences of pleading guilty to one rather than the other”).
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humanity is a more serious crime than war crimes (with which he was also
charged) and that it carries a more serious punishment.154
The court must also ensure that the defendant understands the rights he is
waiving by pleading guilty.155 As noted earlier, these include the right to require
the prosecution to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt at a public trial,
the right to prepare a defense against these charges, the right to be tried without
undue delay, the right to confront adverse witnesses and obtain defense
witnesses, and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself.156 It is now
standard practice for plea agreements at the ICTY and ICTR to list the rights that
defendants are waiving.
The court must also confirm that the defendant understands that the
agreement is not binding on the court, and that the defendant may receive a
sentence up to the maximum available at the international criminal courts—life
imprisonment. Trial chambers often do admonish defendants of these potential
consequences, but have not done so consistently.157 If a defendant affirms that he
understands the charges and the sentencing consequences of the charges, this is
likely to be sufficient to show that the guilty plea is informed.158
International courts have not addressed the question of whether the defendant
must be given access to all evidence material to his defense before a guilty plea.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea may be
informed even when the prosecution did not disclose evidence that could be used
to impeach some of its witnesses.159 But in other common law jurisdictions,
defendants receive such information,160 and in civil law jurisdictions, defendants
receive all material evidence in the case against them before they have to make a
decision whether to admit guilt and waive trial.161
International criminal courts have generally required broader pre-plea
disclosure by the prosecution, at least of exculpatory evidence and certain other
evidence material to the defense. The courts’ rules already require the

154. Id. at ¶ 26–27.
155. Id. at ¶ 15.
156. These waivers are commonly included in written plea agreements between the prosecution and the
defense. E.g., Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-PT, Plea Agreement, ¶ 13 (ICTY Sept. 29, 2003).
157. Julian A. Cook, III, Plea Bargaining at The Hague, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 473, 501 (2005) (criticizing
ICTY plea colloquy procedures as inadequate and arguing that judges ought to ask more questions and provide
more information to defendants to ensure that guilty pleas are voluntary and knowing).
158. Kambanda, Judgement, supra note 138, at ¶ 72; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-S,
Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 6-8, 35 (Feb. 5, 1999).
159. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
160. E.g., New Zealand Criminal Disclosure Act 2008, No. 38 § 12; New South Wales Criminal
Procedure Amendment (Pre-Trial Disclosure) Act 2001, No. 7, §§ 47C-47E; Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 (Eng.) § 3, as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Eng.); R v. DPP ex parte Lee
[1999] 2 All ER 737; R v. Stinchcombe (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Can. S.C.C.).
161. TURNER, supra note 3, at 116, 152.
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prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence “as soon as practicable”162 and to
allow the defense to inspect documents, books, and other tangible objects which
are material to its case.163 At the ICC, Pre-Trial Chambers have gone further and
demanded that the prosecution disclose at least the “bulk” and in some cases the
“totality” of exculpatory evidence before the charges are confirmed.164 Although
the international courts have not fully adopted the civil law approach of
providing all evidence in the investigative file to defendants before they admit
guilt, they have adopted relatively rigorous pre-plea disclosure rules, consistent
with the goal of uncovering the truth and providing an accurate record of the
crimes.
The ICTY and ICTR have also adopted the requirement, imported from
common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Malaysia, that the
guilty plea must not be equivocal.165 As the ICTY Appeals Chamber explained,
this means that the guilty plea “must not be accompanied by words amounting to
a defense contradicting an admission of criminal responsibility.”166 In
determining whether a plea is equivocal, the court may examine whether the plea
was qualified by statements that appear to present a legal defense to the crime.167
The court may specifically question the defendant as to his intention to raise any
defenses, such as duress or insanity.168 This requirement is consistent with
international human rights law and helps protect innocent defendants from
pleading guilty.169
The guilty plea must also rest on a sufficient factual basis. At the ICTY and
ICTR, the court must verify that “there is a sufficient factual basis . . . either on
the basis of independent indicia or on lack of any material disagreement between
the parties about the facts of the case.”170 In other words, the court can establish
factual basis resting solely on the parties’ agreement. This rule effectively allows
the parties to engage in “fact bargaining,” whereby they could agree to a set of

162. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67(2), 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9; ICTY R.
P. & EVID., 68.
163. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77, 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9; ICTY R. P.
& EVID., 66.
164. See INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, FAIRNESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 22
(2011) (discussing cases).
165. Erdemović, Joint Separate Opinion of McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 136, at ¶¶ 28–30.
166. Id. at ¶ 8 (italics added) (Judge Stephen and Judge Liu also joined this part of the opinion. Judge
Cassese filed a Separate Opinion in Erdemović. He turned to international law for guidance and similarly
concluded that the guilty plea must be voluntary, informed, and unequivocal to be valid. But he noted further
that the guilty plea must be supported by facts to be accepted by the court).
167. Id. at ¶ 31.
168. Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶ 52; see also Prosecutor v. Banović,
Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 17 (ICTY Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Banović, Sentencing
Judgement].
169. See Kwiatkowska v. Italy, no. 52868/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 30, 2000); Prosecutor v. Erdemović,
Case. No. IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, ¶ 11 (ICTY Oct. 7, 1997).
170. ICTY R. P. & EVID., 62bis(iv); ICTR R. P. & EVID., 62(B)(iv).
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facts different from the real facts of the case. In practice, trial chambers have
usually conducted an independent inquiry into the facts and have required that
evidence other than the parties’ agreement support the guilty plea.171
Nonetheless, the ICTY and ICTR have recognized that a factual basis inquiry
“do[es] not call for the same scrutiny of facts by a Chamber as in a trial situation
where the Prosecutor has the usual burden of proof.”172
At the ICC, the Statute provides that the factual basis for the plea cannot be
based simply on an agreement between the parties about the facts. Instead, the
court is expected to review the charging documents, the parties’ agreement, any
materials presented by the prosecutor which supplement the charges and which
the accused accepts, and any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses,
presented by the prosecutor or the accused.173 Judges may call on the prosecutor
to present additional evidence if they believe “that a more complete presentation
of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the
interests of the victims.”174
The ICC requirement that admissions of guilt be accompanied by a more
complete presentation of the facts appears to be influenced by the civil law
approach, which attaches great importance to uncovering the precise truth in
criminal cases and creating an authoritative record of events.175 Although the
more probing inquiry may undermine, to some degree, the efficiency of plea
bargaining, it advances the court’s goal of revealing the truth about massive and
systemic international crimes. Given the special significance of transparency and
truth-seeking in international crimes cases, the ICC has arguably struck a more
appropriate balance in this respect than its predecessor international courts.
D. Sentencing Consequences of Guilty Pleas
The international criminal courts’ rules and statutes make no mention of the
sentencing consequences of a guilty plea. But judges have generally accepted that
if plea bargaining is to continue, defendants must receive a more lenient sentence
in return for admitting their guilt. In most plea-bargained cases, therefore, judges

171. Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects, and Propriety, 3 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 671 (2005); see also Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 16–19
(ICTY July 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Mrđa, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgement (ICTY Mar. 31, 2004);
Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶ 52.
172. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T, ICTR-96-17-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Rule 94(B) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, ¶ 26 (ICTR Nov. 22, 2001).
173. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 65(1)(c), 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9.
174. Id. at art. 65(4).
175. See, e.g., Elisabetta Grande, Dances of Criminal Justice: Thoughts on Systemic Differences and the
Search for the Truth, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT 146–47 (John Jackson et al. eds., 2008); Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?: A
German Perspective, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 167–73 (2003).

237

2017 / Plea Bargaining and International Criminal Justice
followed the parties’ agreement and reduced the defendant’s sentence
accordingly.
Courts have not articulated a consistent justification for the sentence
reductions awarded to defendants who plead guilty. At the domestic level, guilty
pleas are typically rewarded because of their practical benefits in conserving
resources of the criminal justice system. This rationale for crediting guilty pleas
is also mentioned at the international level,176 but is not given as a primary reason
for plea-related sentencing reductions.177 More frequently, guilty pleas are
described as deserving of credit because they advance other key goals of
international criminal courts: helping to establish the truth,178 encouraging other
perpetrators to come forward and accept responsibility,179 and contributing to
reconciliation in war-torn societies by showing the defendant’s remorse and
contrition.180 It should be noted, however, that not all decisions have embraced
each of these rationales for guilty pleas. Some courts have held that international
courts should not be awarding sentencing reductions merely for efficiency
purposes,181 that a guilty plea is not necessarily an indication of contrition,182 and
that the contribution of guilty pleas to the discovery of the truth is not always
positive.183
ICTY and ICTR defendants who have pleaded guilty have received, on
average, less than a 30% sentencing discount.184 This is smaller than the typical
discount for guilty pleas in several major national legal systems.185 The
176. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 234 (ICTY Mar.
30, 2004) [hereinafter Deronjić, Sentencing Judgement]. The contribution of guilty pleas to the efficient
operation of the courts is credited as cooperation by the defendant, which is explicitly contemplated by the
courts’ statutes as a mitigating factor. See Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶
84 (ICTY Oct. 17, 2002).
177. Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶¶ 67, 151; Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić,
Case No. IT-94-2-A, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, ¶ 51 (ICTY Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Dragan Nikolić,
Judgement on Sentencing Appeal].
178. E.g., Banović, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 168, at ¶ 68.
179. E.g., Dragan Nikolić, Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 177, at ¶ 55–56.
180. Id.; Deronjić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 176, at ¶ 236; Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement,
supra note 8, at ¶ 76.
181. Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶ 67.
182. E.g., Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 127 (ICTY Dec. 14, 1999) (In
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had “offered no explanation for his voluntary participation in the genocide; nor [had] he expressed contrition,
regret or sympathy for the victims in Rwanda, even when given the opportunity to do so by the Chamber,
during the pre-sentencing] hearing of 3 September 1998”); Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, supra note 96,
at ¶ 51. This was given as one of the reasons why, ultimately, Kambanda was sentenced to life imprisonment
(the highest possible sentence), despite his guilty plea. Kambanda, Judgement, supra note 138, at ¶ 118.
183. Momir Nikolić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 123, at ¶ 60–62.
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differential also varies from defendant to defendant, and it has increased over
time.
IV. THE DEBATE OVER PLEA BARGAINING AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS
Plea bargaining remains more controversial and less common at the
international level than at the national level. Several reasons account for the
skepticism toward plea bargaining in international criminal courts. First, the
granting of concessions to defendants accused of international crimes is
perceived as unseemly given the heinousness and large scale of the crimes in
question. Plea bargaining is seen to dilute the moral message that international
courts aim to send—that the international community is outraged and will bring
to justice those responsible for the crimes committed. Second, plea bargaining is
viewed as interfering with the goal of uncovering the truth about international
crimes. Finally, plea bargaining is said to disrespect victims’ interests in a public
trial and in a sentence proportionate to the defendant’s blameworthiness.
Advocates of the practice counter that plea bargaining is not inherently at odds
with the goals of international criminal justice and, that if properly structured and
administered, a limited form of plea bargaining may provide important benefits
to international criminal courts.
The merits of the first major objection to plea bargaining—that it is unfit to
use in the heinous crimes that international courts handle—depends heavily on
the steepness of the plea discount. If negotiations lead to a sentence of a mere
few years imprisonment for a crime against humanity or genocide, the system
will have failed. A sentence that is disproportionately low would conflict with the
retributive goal of imposing on the offender the punishment he deserves and
expressing commensurate outrage at his actions.186 Overly lenient dispositions
resulting from plea bargains would also reduce the deterrent effect of
international criminal justice, which depends on the swiftness, likelihood, and
severity of punishment.187 International criminal courts already face difficulties
on all three scores: they are neither swift nor very successful in apprehending and
maximum for the charged offense); Nicola Boari & Gianluca Fiorentini, An Economic Analysis of Plea
Bargaining: The Incentives of the Parties in a Mixed Penal System, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 213, 216 (2001);
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significantly larger. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1261 (2008).
186. Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-1-S, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 22 (ICTY Dec. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter Bralo, Sentencing Judgement]; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A,
Judgement, ¶ 185 (ICTY Mar. 24, 2000) (“An equally important factor is retribution. This is not to be
understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community
at these crimes.”)
187. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 765, 769 (2010).
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prosecuting suspects, and their baseline sentences are, by many estimates, too
low. Reducing these sentences further as part of plea bargaining dilutes a
deterrent effect that is already in question.
Plea bargains that result in sentences that are not excessively lenient,
however, can at least increase the swiftness and the likelihood of punishment.
One way they do so is by allowing prosecutors to obtain convictions in the face
of evidentiary difficulties. International prosecutors encounter enormous
challenges in gathering evidence. The crimes committed are often systemic,
widespread, and complex. Investigations tend to take place in territories plagued
by violent conflict or other security risks, and national authorities are often
unwilling or unable to help ICC investigators. Witnesses, too, are frequently
afraid to testify. Given these difficulties, prosecutors may legitimately prefer a
plea bargain resulting in a lower sentence to the risk of an acquittal after trial of a
defendant whom they believe to be guilty. Plea bargaining can also provide
prosecutors with indispensable, inside knowledge that helps them succeed in
other cases against more culpable, high-level offenders.188
More broadly, plea bargaining frees up resources that can be used to
prosecute a greater number of offenders. Given the high costs, complexity, and
length of international trials, this is an important practical consideration.
Although efficiency, in and of itself, is not ordinarily viewed as a point of
emphasis in international criminal justice,189 it is a means to achieving the
broader goal of punishing and deterring international crimes. The ICTY has
expressly recognized this point:
Substantial human and practical benefits flow from a plea of guilty,
particularly one tendered at an early stage in the proceedings. Victims
and witnesses who have already suffered enormous psychological and
physical harm are not required to travel to the Hague to recount their
experiences in court, and potentially re-live their trauma. In addition,
scarce legal, judicial and financial resources that would otherwise be
expended in preparing for and conducting a lengthy and expensive trial
may be redeployed in the interests of securing the wider objectives of the
Tribunal.190
A recent study of the pace of ICTR and ICTY cases shows that cases
resolved by guilty pleas take, on average, half as long as cases resolved by
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Former Yugoslavia, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE ICC: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROF. I.P. BLISHCHENKO 163,
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Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 119, at ¶ 67.
190. Bralo, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 186, at ¶ 64.
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trial.191 The International Criminal Court has recently been considering ways to
expedite its proceedings, and plea bargaining can help accomplish that goal.192
By freeing up resources to investigate and prosecute more defendants, plea
bargaining increases the swiftness and likelihood of punishment. According to a
number of studies, the likelihood and immediacy of punishment are in fact more
influential deterrent factors than the severity of punishment.193 And although plea
bargaining may result in more lenient, and thus, less proportionate punishments
than full trials do, it ensures at least some level of retribution for a great number
of persons who would otherwise evade punishment altogether.194
A second major objection is that plea bargaining undermines the educative
function of international criminal law. International criminal trials are said to
serve the important purpose of reinforcing the rule of law. They send the message
that atrocities, even when committed by those in power, will not be ignored and
will be judged. Because of this emphasis on the rule of law, advocates of
international criminal justice often find truth commissions or various civil or
informal legal mechanisms of dealing with atrocities to be inadequate.195 Plea
bargaining is similarly seen by some to dilute the moral message that
international criminal courts send.
It is true that bargaining does not offer the same educational effect as a trial.
Its abbreviated inquiries into the facts and the lack of witness testimonies deprive
the national and international communities of a powerful and dramatic reminder
of the value of the rule of law. Nonetheless, by producing a conviction, a plea
bargain still reinforces the basic notion that the rule of law reaches those most
responsible for international crimes, even when they are high political and
military leaders. And when formerly powerful leaders admit guilt before the
Tribunals, they “send[] a powerful message about the legitimacy” of the tribunals
and their functions.196
International criminal courts have also stressed the importance of protecting
the rights and interests of victims. This emphasis on victims’ interests likely
reflects, at least in part, the influence of the civil law approach to criminal justice,
in which victims have stronger rights of participation in criminal cases. But it is
also influenced by human rights jurisprudence, which emphasizes the right of
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victims of human rights atrocities to receive full judicial remedies for the wrongs
done to them.197
Trials at international courts are said to serve survivors of the crimes by
helping them and their communities achieve a sense of closure. One author has
called them “an enormous national psychodrama, psychotherapy on a nationwide
scale.”198 Trials provide a forum for victims to tell their stories and to have the
wrongs done to them formally acknowledged.199 Against this background, plea
bargaining seems an unpalatable alternative from a victim’s perspective—it
shortcuts the trial proceedings and the healing function they may provide for
victims, and it reduces the punishment imposed on offenders.200
But advocates of plea bargaining note that the tension between victims’
interests and plea bargaining is not always so strong. First, international criminal
courts can allow victims to participate in plea hearings and express their views on
proposed plea bargains. The ICC legal framework already includes some
provisions allowing for greater victim participation at the proceedings on
admission of guilt.201 Courts can also encourage the types of guilty pleas that are
more likely to be valuable to victims—unequivocal, detailed, and accompanied
by genuine and voluntary expressions of remorse.202 Moreover, at least in the
eyes of some victims, avoiding trial testimony may be a benefit. A plea bargain
spares these victims the inconvenience of traveling to another country to testify,
the concern about their and their family’s safety, and the ordeal of facing the
defendant, reliving the trauma they experienced, and possibly having their
credibility questioned during cross-examination.203 Plea bargains also benefit all
victims by ensuring a speedier completion of the proceedings and facilitating any
compensation claims they may have, and thus allowing them to move forward
with their lives.204
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In addition to protecting victims’ interests, international criminal courts also
aim to promote peace and reconciliation in the region where the crimes took
place. This is a goal that is unique to criminal trials at the international level and
was used to justify the creation of modern international criminal tribunals.205 By
locating individual responsibility for crimes, international criminal trials aim to
end accusations targeted at entire groups and thus break a cycle of conflict.206
Proponents of plea bargaining argue that guilty pleas can also contribute to
this goal of international criminal justice. When defendants plead guilty, they
accept individual responsibility for their actions and help reveal the truth in
relation to the crimes charged. By helping establish the truth, guilty pleas
contribute to the healing and reconciliation process.207 The expression of remorse
that typically accompanies a guilty plea also promotes reconciliation.208 As a
witness commented on the guilty plea of Miroslav Deronjić, “The Bosnian
Muslims in the community that I have spoken to, felt relieved because he
admitted his guilt. This is a positive thing and can heal the wounds of the
community provided that he is punished adequately.”209
But the effect of guilty pleas on reconciliation is not straightforward. When
pleas are accompanied by significant sentencing discounts, they are controversial
among victims and often stir further resentment rather than reconciliation.210
Even when accompanied by statements of remorse, such guilty pleas are often
seen as disingenuous and motivated purely by the sentencing reductions. For
guilty pleas to have a positive effect on reconciliation, they may have to be
accompanied by remorseful actions, not just by mere statements, in order to
receive a sizable sentencing discount. Courts may choose to grant such
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sentencing reductions only when the defendant has taken reparative steps beyond
a guilty plea—by surrendering voluntarily, cooperating with the prosecution in
other cases, revealing information beyond that already known to the prosecution,
or taking other conciliatory actions toward victims.211 International courts may
also have to conduct more active outreach work in victim communities to explain
the justifications for plea bargains.212
International criminal courts have also committed to providing fair trials and
following procedures that can serve as a model for criminal justice systems
around the world. Advocates of plea bargaining argue that the practice is
consistent with international human rights law because of the procedural
safeguards that international courts have introduced to ensure that a guilty plea is
voluntary, informed, and factually based.213 Critics counter that courts have not
sufficiently addressed the problem that guilty pleas may be coerced through
excessive sentencing discounts and that defendants do not always receive
sufficient information to waive their rights to trial knowingly and intelligently.214
Defendants may also suffer unfairness when they plead guilty with the
expectation of receiving a sentence reduction, but the court refuses to follow the
parties’ agreement as to the sentence.215 Since the court is not bound by the
agreement, a defendant who pleads guilty is effectively throwing himself at the
mercy of the judges. And although defendants receive notice before they plead
guilty, that the agreement is not binding on the court, this does not entirely
eliminate the underlying fairness concern.
Finally, plea bargaining has a complicated relationship to the goal of
establishing an accurate record of international crimes. International criminal
tribunals have recognized that guilty pleas contribute to the establishment of the
truth. Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the substantial weight that guilty pleas
carry in mitigation.216 When defendants plead guilty, they may reveal inside
information that would otherwise not surface during a trial—for example, how a
leadership structure worked or why certain crimes were committed. By accepting
responsibility, defendants can also help prevent inaccurate revisionist accounts of
history.217 Once political and military leaders admit their guilt openly in court,
“[d]enial of the commission of the crime may no longer be an option for those
211. Cf. Clark, supra note 200, at 433.
212. Id.
213. Human rights jurisprudence generally affirms the legality of plea bargains, as long as the waiver of
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with closing down his business if he chose a trial instead of accepting the settlement offered by the
prosecution).
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who have convinced themselves that the Tribunal is biased or that its judgements
[sic] are based on weak or even false evidence.”218
Prosecutors and courts must nonetheless remain aware of the risk that plea
bargains could undermine the goal of compiling a precise record by omitting
facts and failing to test them rigorously through an adversarial procedure. It is
always possible that “[n]either the public, nor the judges themselves [will] come
closer to know the truth beyond what is accepted in the plea agreement.”219
Charge bargains are especially problematic in this respect:
If the Prosecutor makes a plea agreement such that the totality of an
individual’s criminal conduct is not reflected or the remaining charges do
not sufficiently reflect the gravity of offenses committed by the accused,
questions will inevitably arise as to whether justice is in fact being done.
The public may be left to wonder about the motives for guilty pleas,
whether the conviction in fact reflects the full criminal conduct of the
accused and whether it establishes a credible and complete historical
record.220
As the Momir Nikolić Trial Chamber emphasized, it is especially important
for international courts to supervise charge bargains and ensure that important
facts are not omitted or distorted in the effort to resolve a case consensually.221
The stricter oversight of charge bargains is consistent with civil law approaches
to criminal procedure, and more importantly, with the international criminal
courts’ goal to establish the truth and provide an accurate record of the crimes.
In summary, the propriety of plea bargaining at international criminal courts
continues to be debated and depends greatly on the form that the practice takes.
Certain types of plea bargains may interfere with victims’ interests and with the
truth-seeking, retributive, and deterrent goals of the courts. Others may advance
these goals, or at the very least avoid conflicting with them. To maximize the
value of plea bargains, courts must consider their design carefully.
In this respect, the ICC Statute is an advancement over the ICTY and ICTR
Rules on plea bargaining. The ICC Statute emphasizes the importance of
gathering ample facts to support an admission of guilt and the duty of judges to
review the facts independently. This approach strengthens the historical record
that plea bargains produce and enhances the fairness of plea bargaining to
defendants and victims. The ICC expressly entrusts judges with the responsibility
of ensuring that plea bargains are consistent with the interests of justice and of
victims. It also provides for the possibility of victim participation at the
proceedings on admission of guilt, and allows them to make their views on
218.
219.
220.
221.
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particular plea bargains known. Finally, the ICC provides that an admission of
guilt may be tendered only after consultation with defense counsel, thus
increasing the likelihood that the admission will be voluntary and informed.
The ICC’s approach to plea bargaining therefore has great potential to
advance the court’s broader goals. As noted earlier, the court is set to receive its
first guilty plea later this year from Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, to the war crime of
“attacking buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments.”222 The
defendant is expected to admit openly to his crimes and to express remorse for
them. The court’s approach to this guilty plea will set an important precedent for
the future course of plea bargaining at the ICC.
As the ICC considers the place that plea bargaining can have in its
proceedings, it ought to consider other critical questions concerning guilty pleas
that have arisen at the international criminal tribunals and in some domestic
systems. For example, the ICC may wish to elaborate on the voluntariness
standard and furnish examples of the kinds of pressure that may render a guilty
plea involuntary. It is important to resolve whether threats of substantially greater
punishment or promises of extraordinary lenient sentences might render guilty
pleas involuntary. If the answer is yes, then the ICC ought to take steps to
prevent such involuntary pleas (for example, by setting a fixed ceiling on plea
discounts and by strictly supervising charge bargains).
It would also be helpful for the ICC to apply a presumption that defendants
have to accept responsibility for their actions in order to receive a sentencing
reduction. Guilty pleas should be unequivocal to be valid, as the Rules of the
ICTY and ICTR provide. In addition, before awarding any significant sentencing
discounts, ICC judges may require evidence of remorse that goes beyond mere
statements and includes actions that suggest contrition. Such a requirement can
help ensure that guilty pleas, even when accompanied by significant sentencing
discounts, still contribute to reconciliation in the region affected by the crimes in
question.
Finally, judges ought to actively use the tools provided by the ICC Statute
and call for additional presentation of evidence when reviewing admissions of
guilt. This practice would enhance the contribution of admissions of guilt to the
discovery of the truth and the presentation of an accurate record, which remains a
central goal of international criminal courts. Considering approaches such as
these should encourage policymakers to rethink the role of plea bargaining in
international criminal law and design procedures that are fair, efficient, and
consistent with the goals of international criminal justice.
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